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INVESTOR REACTION TO MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE: 
EVIDENCE FROM UK DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Investor reaction to mutual fund performance conditions the behavior of mutual 
fund managers and fund complexes and thus has widely reaching ramifications 
for the trading of assets worldwide.  In particular, the mutual funds literature has 
long argued that convexity in the money flow-performance relation influences 
risk-taking by funds.  Existing empirical studies, however, largely focus on the 
average US investor, obscuring the possibly disparate contributions of different 
clienteles.  We analyze UK data on monthly fund sales and purchases made via 
seven distinct distribution channels. We show that there exist marked 
differences in the reaction to fund performance between different types of retail 
and institutional investors.  These differences can be understood by considering 
the incentives of parties involved in each distribution channel.  Our flow-
performance analysis by channel indicates that the well-documented aggregate 
net flow-performance convexity in mutual funds is driven by the extreme 
reaction of retail inflows to favorable performance particularly from 
independently advised investors. 
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Understanding the determinants of mutual fund money flows has been the goal of an 
impressive amount of recent empirical research (Gruber (1996), Sirri and Tufano (1998), 
Bergstresser and Poterba (2002), Nanda et al. (2004), Barber et al. (2005), and many 
others).  While this literature has repeatedly demonstrated that the net flow-performance 
relationship across all investors is convex, it has been much less vocal regarding who the 
different investors are and whether they all act in similar ways.
1
  In particular we have 
little idea of the range of flow-performance relationships across mutual fund investors 
and whether the different incentives they face might influence the way they buy and sell 
funds.  Limited data on investor behavior has been a key reason for this oversight. 
Understanding the investment behavior of different mutual fund clienteles would reveal 
which investors and which of their decisions are responsible for the aggregate flow 
performance relationship we observe.  In addition, doing so would give us greater insight 
into the incentives asset managers face and also inform us of the strategies that funds 
might use to maximize fee income and assets under management.  Hence understanding 
how different clienteles react to fund performance is an issue of first-order importance to 
fund sponsors.
2
 
 
We are able to address these issues by relying on a unique British dataset where fund 
flows can be studied in greater detail than hitherto possible in a comprehensive sample.  
For each fund, sales and repurchases are observed every month.  In addition, money 
flows from retail and institutional investors are kept separate.  Lastly, retail and 
                                                 
1
 By contrast, the corresponding issues are much better understood in the context of stock 
investing (e.g. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000)).  
2
 Boudoukh et al. (2003) discuss the impact of the performance-flow relationship on the stream of 
fees earned by mutual fund companies. 
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institutional flows are disaggregated by distribution channel.  Thus, each month and for 
each fund, we know, for example, the amount of money put in by retail investors acting 
through a financial advisor and the amount of money withdrawn by pension funds.  Our 
dataset covers the majority of the U.K.’s domestic equity mutual funds over the 1992-
2001 period and is not limited to survivors.  Our data allow us to examine whether there 
are meaningful differences in the way fund flows respond to past performance for 
different distribution channels, to understand which investors are responsible for the well 
documented convexity in aggregate net flows and to shed light on the role of incentives in 
shaping the flow-performance relation. 
 
Our research contributes to a burgeoning empirical literature on mutual fund investor 
behavior.  Following the seminal flow-performance work by Ippolito (1992), Gruber 
(1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998), to understand the net 
flow-performance relation in greater depth, a second strand of the literature separately 
examines fund investor buying and selling behaviors (O’Neal (2004), Ivkovic and 
Weisbenner (2009)).    They document that outflows behave quite differently from 
inflows, highlighting the dangers of using net flow data to understand investor buying 
and selling actions.  A third strand of work has studied money flows originating from 
different categories of investors (Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), Bergstresser et al. (2007), 
James and Karceski (2006), Christoffersen et al. (2007)).  Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) 
find differences between the flow-performance relation of retail mutual fund investors 
and institutional investors.  They show that retail investors chase past winners with far 
greater intensity than institutional investors and that only institutional investors sell 
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poorly performing funds.  This results in retail flows being markedly more convex than 
institutional flows.  James and Karceski (2006) observe that investors in institutional 
funds are less reactive to raw performance but more reactive to risk-adjusted performance 
than are investors in retail funds.   Bergstresser, Chalmers and Tufano (2007) and 
Christoffersen, Evans and Musto (2007) examine whether brokers put a brake on 
investors’ behavioral biases by reducing flow-performance sensitivity.  While 
Bergstresser, Chalmers and Tufano suggest that this is not the case, Christoffersen, Evans 
and Musto using more disaggregated flow data find that it is retail investors who invest 
without a broker that have the highest flow-performance sensitivity.   
 
To date, work on the determinants of mutual fund flows has been overwhelmingly U.S.-
based.  Examining what drives money flows in the mature and substantial U.K. mutual 
fund marketplace provides a much needed out-of-sample test of our understanding of this 
area that has been lacking to date.  In addition, in at least one respect, the U.K. is a 
“cleaner” institutional setting to study how investors select funds than is the U.S.  In the 
U.S. capital gains tax overhang considerations complicate fund purchase and sale 
decisions for investors and therefore make the interpretation of the observed relation 
between flows and fund performance more difficult.  This issue does not arise in the U.K. 
 
Our main results are as follows.   We find that there are statistically significant 
differences in the flow-performance relationship across distribution channels both within 
retail and within institutional categories.   This is important because it tells us that 
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changes in distribution channel mix can lead to very different outcomes in terms of the 
aggregate flow-performance relationship we observe. 
 
How do flow-performance sensitivities differ across the different distribution channels? 
Retail channels as a whole are more responsive to fund performance than institutional 
channels and this comes through at the individual channel level.  Among the retail 
channels, independently advised investor flows chase winners and sell losers most 
strongly.  At the other end of the flow sensitivity spectrum, tied-agents investors do not 
react to poor or favorable performance with their buys and sells.  In between these two 
channels we have the private clients’ channel where investors don't sell losers but do 
actually chase winners, and the direct investors’ channel where there is significant 
evidence of winner chasing and loser selling although at a much more restrained level 
than for the independently advised investor channels.  For our institutional channels, we 
find that flows into mutual funds from pension funds are performance responsive, as are 
insurer flows that derive from insurance products where insurers sell a menu of mutual 
funds to retail investors.  In contrast, where buy and sell decisions of mutual funds are 
made by insurers at the company level rather than at the individual level, we find that 
flows are not performance responsive.   
 
It is possible to understand these differences in the flow-performance relationship across 
channels by examining the incentives of parties involved in each channel.  Three out of 
our four retail channels involve advisors.  When advisors are paid each time that investors 
switch funds (as is the case for the independent advisor channel), then not surprisingly 
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investors are more sensitive responsive to both poor and favorable performance.   
However, when advisors are not paid in a “transaction-based” fashion and the advisor 
client relationship is more long-term (as is the case for tied-agent advisors and private 
client advisors), we find that outflow sensitivities are much lower.  This is consistent with 
advisors telling clients to weather performance-related storms especially if they 
understand that chasing past performance is not worthwhile.  Direct investors that are 
neither pushed by transaction-based advisors nor restrained by long-term advisors show 
an intermediate level of flow-performance sensitivity, as we might expect. 
 
Incentives also play a vital role in explaining institutional mutual fund flow behavior.  
The performance sensitivity of flows from pension funds can be rationalised if we 
understand that pension funds are typically advised by consultants who need to justify 
their hiring.  As their recommendations are more likely to be acted on following extremes 
of poor and favourable performance, unsurprisingly we see high flow-performance 
sensitivity for this channel.   
 
Incentives can also explain the flow-performance relationship for the two insurer 
channels.  For the channel where insurers offer a changing menu of mutual funds to retail 
clients we see high inflow sensitivities to performance.  This is consistent with their 
incentives as they know that to maximize retail inflows they need to offer funds that have 
recently done well and to withdraw from funds that have recently done poorly.  As a 
result, we observe inflows for this channel that are very sensitive to favorable 
performance.  As these changes to the menu of funds offered by insurers affect inflows 
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but not outflows, it is not surprising that we see limited outflow sensitivity to poor fund 
performance for the unitised insurer channel.  As such menu-based incentives are not 
present for the second insurer channel where flow decisions are made at the company 
level rather than at the individual investor level,  we see much lower levels of flow-
performance sensitivity for this channel.   
 
Our results also shed light on the origins of the well-documented convexity in the 
aggregate flow-performance relationship. We show that it is the convexity of inflows 
rather than outflows that explain aggregate convexity and in particular the convexity of 
retail inflows. Fund sales primarily through the independently advised channel are 
responsible for the retail inflow convexity observed.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section I discusses features of the 
various investment channels used to access mutual funds in the U.K.  Section II 
introduces our mutual fund data and variables and demonstrates that there are clear 
differences in the inflow-performance and the outflow-performance relation which we 
study separately in Sections III and IV, respectively.  Section V discusses our findings 
and concludes. 
I. Institutional Background: Fund Distribution in the U.K. 
While mutual fund distribution in the U.S. has been addressed in a number of recent 
papers, much less is known about this issue for other countries, the U.K. included.  We 
therefore provide here an overview of mutual fund distribution in the U.K.  During the 
time period we examine, retail investors could buy mutual funds in one of four ways: 
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directly from a fund management company; using an independent financial advisor 
(IFA); using a tied agent affiliated to a fund management company; or using a private 
client advisor.
3
  Private client advice refers to portfolio management services offered by 
banks, stockbrokers and law firms.   
 
Independent advisors are primarily paid on a transaction basis through initial 
commissions (IFAs received 90% of their money in the form of commissions during our 
sample period, Datamonitor, 2001) with this fee coming from the front-end payment 
made by retail investors.   In particular, if an existing investor switches funds outside the 
current fund family, the independent advisor receives the front-end payment again.  In 
contrast, tied agents affiliated to one family are paid through a combination of salary and 
commissions.  While they might be paid for new money invested, they are not paid for 
money switches between funds in the same family as this money is seen as being already 
“captive” within the fund management company.  Therefore the incentive to encourage 
investor switches is present for independent advisors but not for tied agent advisors.  
Private client advisors are typically paid through fixed fee or as a percentage of assets 
under management.   As advisors within this channel are not paid on a transaction basis, 
we would expect less fund switching than for the independent advisors channel and hence 
lower flow-performance sensitivities.   
 
                                                 
3
 During the span of our study, polarization rules were in place in the UK that placed restrictions 
on the types of companies able to advise retail investors on mutual fund purchases.  These rules 
required that firms either offer fully independent advice and not be tied to any fund management 
company or be affiliated to one and only one company selling funds.  These polarization rules 
were put in place in 1987 in an attempt to simplify the advisory landscape for retail investors by 
eliminating the scope for advisors claiming independence when this was in fact not the case.   
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The main institutions investing into mutual funds in our data are insurance companies and 
pension schemes.  Money invested in mutual funds from insurance companies comes 
from two distinct sources: unit-linked policies and in-house insurance policies.  In the 
case of unit-linked policies, the insurer gives investors a choice of mutual funds to invest 
in.  We would expect that in order to maximize their sales insurers would offer funds that 
have recently done well and withdraw from their offering funds that have recently done 
poorly, and hence the menu of funds offered  to attract fund buys will be performance 
sensitive.  In the case of in-house insurance policies, rather than retail investors choosing 
over a set of funds, the insurer has discretion over the funds that are selected.  Pension 
schemes, on the other hand, be they corporate or local government-run, all rely on the 
trustee structure for their investment decisions, and can therefore be reasonably 
considered as a single category.
4
  The decision-makers of these schemes may purchase 
equity and debt securities directly or may do so indirectly by purchasing units in funds. 
Pension fund trustees normally rely on pension fund consultants to help them make their 
allocation decisions. 
II. Data and Variables 
A. Money Flow Data 
Our key dataset consists of fund-level money flow data collected monthly by the U.K.’s 
Investment Management Association (IMA) from its member firms over the ten-year 
                                                 
4
 We include charities together with pensions for the same reason. 
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period 1992-2001 (the dataset additionally includes monthly fund TNAs).
5
  These money 
flow data are disaggregated by investor type and distribution channel into the seven 
categories discussed in the preceding section: 
 
Retail channels       Institutional channels 
1) direct investment;       5) unitized insurance;  
2) investment via an independent     6) in-house insurance;  
financial advisor;       7) pension fund channels.   
3) investment via tied sales force;  
4) private clients.   
 
As retail and institutional flows are further disaggregated by investment channel, this 
dataset constitutes a refinement of the one used by Keswani and Stolin (2008).  The 
advantage of our dataset relative to the one Christoffersen et al. (2007) collected for the 
U.S. using funds’ N-SAR responses is that virtually all money flows – both investor sales 
and investor repurchases – are attributed by the fund itself to one of the distribution 
channels.  By contrast, N-SAR only allows indirect inference of flow type based on 
commissions paid, which means that disaggregation is not possible for the case of funds 
where different channels coexist, and that only sales to investors, but not redemptions, 
                                                 
5The fact that our database does not cover more recent years is the reverse side of its level of 
detail, as recent data on channel-level inflows and outflows are deemed to be too valuable to be 
disclosed at the individual fund level.  As the channels discussed in the paper and the incentives 
of parties involved in each channel remain the same there is no reason to believe that our 
conclusions would have been different had we used a closer to the present sample 
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can be studied in this way.  Further, only the first three of our seven channels are present 
in the N-SAR derived dataset. 
 
How different are the investors that use the different channels? According to the IMA, 
flows associated with the pension fund channel originate from "self-administered pension 
funds run by private companies and local authorities or from registered charities."   The 
investors that are captured by the two insurance channels are different from each other 
and are different from the pension fund channel as well.  While the unitized insurance 
channel measures investment decisions by unit-linked policyholders investing through 
insurers into a set of funds pre-selected by the insurer, the in-house insurance channel 
captures flow decisions made by insurance companies as part of their asset-liability 
management. 
 
On the retail distribution side, those entering through the private client channel are high 
net worth individuals receiving a comprehensive wealth management service of which 
mutual fund selection is one part.  The other three channels – direct, tied agent, and 
independent sales force (IFA) potentially can be used by the same set of individuals.  
Nonetheless, the fact that these distribution channels co-exist suggests that they hold 
different appeals for different client types.  Survey evidence such as Alexander at al. 
(1998) finds that direct retail fund investors who make their decisions unaided are 
significantly more financially literate than other categories of retail investors.  In 
particular, Alexander et al. show that these investors hold more realistic views on mutual 
fund persistence and also better comprehend the impact of fund fees on effective fund 
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returns than investors who use financial advice. Lastly, the distinction between tied 
versus independent sales force is the subject of a substantial literature (e.g. Berger et al., 
1997).  In the specific context of UK financial services, Gough and Nurullah (2009) use 
survey evidence to show that clients relying on IFAs are more likely to be older, 
wealthier, and male than those relying on tied agents. 
  
Several issues need to be dealt with in preparing our fund money flow data for analysis.  
First, not all funds are open to all types of fund investors at all times.  Rather than 
eliminating all zero-flow observations which might result in the loss of valuable 
information, we take a more careful approach.  To capture when a given channel is 
inactive, we exclude zero-flow observations if a channel did not experience any activity 
since the start of the sample period (i.e. the fund plausibly had not started distributing via 
that channel) or if the channel did not experience any activity subsequently (i.e. the fund 
stopped distributing via that channel) or if the channel did not experience any activity for 
a full year (i.e. the fund suspended distribution via that channel).  
 
Second, we need to make our fund flow measure comparable across channels.  Virtually 
all of the literature on mutual fund flows recognizes that higher levels of existing 
investment are expected to be associated with higher flow levels, and therefore scales 
monetary flows by the corresponding stock of money already invested.   Unfortunately, 
channel-level TNA is not available to us.  Scaling channels’ monetary flow by the same 
fund-level TNA, while doable, would be misleading.   Consider the case of two channels 
comprised of similar investors, except that the first channel has k times the number of 
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investors of the second, and consequently averages k times the monetary flow of the 
second channel.  (We would therefore expect the TNA attributable to the first channel to 
be around k times the TNA attributable to the second channel.)  Scaling both channels’ 
monetary flow by the same fund-level TNA would make the behavior of investors using 
the first channel appear k times more volatile, and k times more reactive to performance, 
than the behavior of the second fund’s investors – even when we know the two groups of 
investors behave alike.   
 
Our normalized flow measure addresses this problem.  Our method involves first scaling 
each month’s flow from each channel into each fund by the fund’s value at the start of the 
month and then scaling the result by the corresponding aggregate ratio (i.e. all flows via 
that channel in that month are divided by the aggregate value at the start of that month of 
funds for which these flows are present).   This normalized flow measure captures the 
growth rate of a fund via a specified distribution channel as compared to the growth rate 
of all funds via the same channel. 
6
  Mathematically, we can write our normalized flows 
as 
  0)(0)(
),(
),(
),(
i
i
cflow
i
cflow
i
i
i
i TNA
dcflow
TNA
dcflowdcnflow  
where flow and nflow are the raw and normalized money flows, respectively.  These 
flows are indexed by c, the distribution channel, and d, the flow direction, while i refers 
to the individual fund.  TNA represents the total net assets of the fund, and  
                                                 
6
 Rearranging terms, we can also interpret our normalized flow measure as a fund’s share of total 
money flows via a given channel, scaled by the ratio of the fund’s value to the sum of values of 
all funds open to that distribution channel.   
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0)( icflow  is shorthand for selecting only fund-months which have some investor 
activity (in any direction) for that distribution channel.  Time subscripts are suppressed. 
 
To illustrate the workings of the above measure, recall our earlier two-channel example.  
In it, the first channel’s flow scaled by the (all-channel) TNA would be roughly k times 
the corresponding ratio for the second channel – both for the average fund, and in 
aggregate.  Because our measure divides the flow-to-TNA ratio for each fund-month by 
the corresponding aggregate ratio, this adjustment means that our measure avoids 
distortion due solely to a channel’s size.  In other words, it eliminates the possibility that 
channels will appear to behave differently even when the underlying investor behaviors 
are the same, the only distinction being the scale on which these behaviors are deployed.  
It also has the related conceptual advantage that the fund-value weighted mean 
normalized flow for each channel is equal to unity by construction.
 7
 
 
As our study is preoccupied with investor reaction to fund performance, we exclude 
index funds from our sample.  We additionally exclude around one percent of highly 
unusual fund-months where either sales or repurchases total over a quarter of fund TNA.  
Lastly, we require data on investment returns and fund characteristics to be available 
(these are described in the next two subsections).  Our final sample consists of 31,692 
fund-months from February 1992 through December 2001, corresponding to 266 actively 
                                                 
7 We choose not to normalize our fund-level percentage flows by the standard deviation of flows 
for that fund across its channels or alternatively by the standard deviation of flows across funds 
for that channel as neither approach would allow us to compare flow-performance sensitivities 
across the different channels as directly as the measure we use. 
. 
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managed domestic equity funds per month on average and representing 470 distinct 
funds.
8
  Table I, Panel A summarizes the distribution of money flows for our sample. 
 
[Table I here] 
 
The first column of Table I, Panel A shows that the number of observations differs 
significantly across channels.  While there are over 26,000 fund-months with retail 
investors’ direct and advised fund sales or repurchases, tied agents are responsible for 
retail investor activity in 15,550 fund-months and private clients show signs of activity 
for only 7,298 fund-months.  With respect to institutional investors, it can be seen that 
unitized insurance, in-house insurance, and pensions account for 12,370, 6,957 and 
12,731 observations respectively.  The residual “other” category is only present in 3,914 
fund-months (because this small category is heterogeneous and poorly understood, it is 
excluded from the analyses to follow).  Overall, individual investor activity is present in 
30,610 fund-months in our sample as compared to 21,558 fund-months for institutional 
investors.
9
 
                                                 
8
 The IMA obtains money flow information directly from its member companies every month.  
Not all management groups report this information; however, since information is collected live 
and historical information is not discarded, there is no bias toward surviving funds in the data 
collection process.  Nonetheless, we confirmed that there is no survivorship bias in our sample: 
after controlling for the calendar month, the average difference between monthly returns for our 
sample and for the population of UK equity funds is only -0.9 basis points per month (p-
value=0.64). 
9
 Prior US work on by-channel mutual fund flows does not allow for funds that serve more than 
one channel.  Bergstresser, Chalmers and Tufano (2007) divide funds in their sample depending 
on whether investors are buying into the fund primarily through a broker or not.  Christoffersen, 
Evans and Musto (2007) categorize funds using load payments into affiliated broker, unaffiliated 
broker or no-load categories.  One inherent advantage of our dataset is that it more realistically 
allows for mixed-channel funds; the mean number of distribution channels per fund is 3.9 in our 
sample and the median number is 4.  Interestingly, fewer than seven per cent of funds are 
 15
 
Turning to the size of raw money flows for the different investment channels, we first 
note that inflows and outflows for each channel are of comparable magnitude, with 
inflows typically somewhat larger (although there has been a net outflow of direct retail 
and in-house insurance money from U.K. equity sectors during the 1992-2001 time 
period).  However, there are significant differences in flow size and variability across 
channels.  For example, monthly inflows intermediated by a tied agent are over four 
times larger on average than direct inflows, and their standard deviation is likewise over 
four times larger.  The analogous ratios for pensions as compared to in-house insurance 
are around two.  Such differences across channels greatly complicate comparisons of 
different investors’ behaviors, notably in studying investor reactions to past performance.  
Further, simply expressing fund money flow as percentage of fund TNA is of little help 
because the different types of flows often pertain to the same fund-months (for example, 
in the case of direct and independent advisor flows, the overlap is over 90 percent) and 
even when this is not the case, fund sizes are not proportionate to flow amounts for the 
different channels.  When, however, flows are normalized both by fund size and by the 
ratio of total flows to total fund size for the channel-month in question, then the 
variability of the flow measure across channels is much reduced.  For example, the mean 
direct and tied agent inflows are now 1.51 and 1.24, respectively (note that these are 
equally weighted means; value-weighted means for our normalized flows equal unity by 
construction).  Likewise, their 6.01 and 3.56 standard deviations are much closer to one 
another than are the standard deviations for the corresponding raw flows.  The same is 
                                                                                                                                                 
distributed through a single channel in our data, implying that retaining only the most important 
channel for each fund would misrepresent over nine-tenths of our sample.  
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true for most of the rest of Table 1, Panel A.  Although our normalization procedure does 
not equate means and standard deviations across channels perfectly, it is nonetheless a 
marked improvement on using raw flows, facilitating comparisons of different investors’ 
behavior in subsequent sections.  Overall, of the £62.6 billion in money inflows in our 
sample, £38.9 billion, or 62 percent are due to retail investors; of the £46.9 billion in 
outflows, £25.4 billion, or 54 percent come from retail investors.  Note that looking at net 
flows would mask most of the investor activity we get to observe. 
 
Table I, Panel B reports correlations among normalized flows for the different investment 
channels pooled across fund-months.  Correlations for inflows are below the diagonal, 
and correlations for outflows are above the diagonal.  We start by noting that, for retail 
and institutional flows taken in aggregate, correlations are quite low: 0.117 for inflows, 
and 0.063 for outflows.   Correlations between individual channels’ normalized inflows 
range from -0.042 to 0.191, for correlations of in-house insurance with direct and private 
investor flows, respectively.  The range of correlations on the outflow side is even 
smaller, from -0.029 (direct and tied agent investors) to 0.162 (advised retail flows and 
pensions).  The fact that the seven different channels have such low correlations indicates 
that total flows are the aggregate result of quite disparate investor behaviors and that to 
understand the investor decision-making processes that drive the mutual fund 
marketplace in general and the convexity of the flow-performance relation in particular, it 
is important to examine the different investment channels individually.  The last column 
of Panel B reports correlations between inflows and corresponding outflows, for each 
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investment channel.  Consistent with U.S. research (e.g. O’Neal (2004)), these 
correlations are positive, albeit small in magnitude. 
B. Fund Returns and Performance Measurement 
Our fund return data are survivorship-bias-free and come from Quigley and Sinquefield 
(2000), who collected monthly returns for the U.K.’s domestic equity funds over the 1975 
to 1997 period, and subsequently extended this dataset to the end of 2001.  As in U.S. 
studies, our returns are gross of tax but net of management fees.
10
  In addition to raw 
returns, we measure performance as the Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha.  To do so, each 
month we estimate each fund’s factor loadings by running the following regression over 
the preceding 36 months:  
itt
i
UMDt
i
HMLt
i
SMBt
i
MKTtit eUMDHMLSMBMKTRFR   , 
where Rit is the rate of return on investment i in month t, RFt  is the risk-free interest rate 
in month t, MKTt is the return on the market portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate, and 
SMBt , HMLt and UMDt are returns on the size, value, and momentum factor mimicking 
portfolios, respectively.
11
   A fund’s four-factor alpha in a given month is obtained by 
subtracting the products of factor realizations and estimated factor loadings from the 
                                                 
10
 Gross of tax returns could not be collected for approximately 10% of fund-months in our 
dataset, in which cases we estimate them as the corresponding net return plus the average gross-
net difference for that calendar month. 
11
 Our monthly size and value factor realizations come from Dimson, Nagel, and Quigley (2003), 
who confirm the size and value effects in the U.K.  Our monthly momentum factor is constructed 
following Carhart (1997).  Specifically, each month we rank all U.K. firms listed on the London 
Stock Exchange on their 11-month returns lagged by one month, and calculate the difference 
between the average returns of the highest and the lowest 30% of firms.  The only deviation from 
Carhart’s method is that our averages are value-weighted, to avoid spurious results due to “micro-
cap” companies.  Monthly returns and market capitalizations are taken from London Business 
School’s London Share Price Database. 
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fund’s excess returns.  These monthly alphas are then averaged to produce annual four-
factor alphas.
12
 
[Table II here] 
C. Control Variables 
The existing literature has identified a number of fund attributes that appear to influence 
the flow of investor money.  While our focus is on the performance-flow relation, we 
include the most important of these variables as controls.  To do so, we manually collect 
and link across years data from consecutive editions of the annual Unit Trust Year Book 
corresponding to year-end 1991 through year-end 2000.  The variables we are able to 
collect in this way are the fund’s initial and annual fees as well as the fund’s launch date, 
which we convert into fund age.   In addition, using the data on the identity of the funds’ 
management companies we calculate the number of funds in the fund family.  Lastly, we 
have fund TNA from the most recent month (obtained from the same source as our fund 
money flows).   Table II shows weighted means of these variables, where the weights are 
inflows taking place through the different distribution channels, except the last two rows 
of the table, where value- and equally-weighted means are reported.  The average fund 
has £171.1 million in assets under management.  Of course, money tends to go to larger 
funds on average, so that the average pound sterling spent by retail investors is associated 
with £477.5 in assets under management, and the corresponding figure for institutional 
investors is greater still, at £858.7 million.  Looking at the initial fee, we find that retail 
investors pay nearly 5 percent on average (note that in practice, the advertised initial fee 
                                                 
12
 We do not use the alpha directly estimated from the regression because it characterizes the 
entire 36-month estimation period, whereas we are interested in the impact of shorter-term 
performance. 
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may be discounted).  Institutional investors, on the other hand, pay substantially less, 3.66 
percent (of course, the minimum investment amounts required to access lower initial fees 
are larger).  This result is due largely to pension funds, whose upfront payments average 
below 3 percent.  Annual fees, too, are lower for institutional investors, at 0.96 percent as 
compared to 1.26 for retail investors.
13
  Once again, pension funds’ fees are especially 
low, 0.8 percent.  With regard to fund age, differences across channels are even more 
pronounced: for example, retail investors buying into funds directly tend to choose funds 
that are 8 years older on average than are funds selected with the help of tied agents.  
Lastly, the number of funds in a family averages 20, although pension money tends to go 
to funds whose families are quite a bit larger, whereas tied agents favor funds with fewer 
siblings. 
D. Preliminary Evidence on the Flow-Performance Relation 
[Figure I here] 
Probably the best known fact about the mutual fund flow-performance relation is the 
strong non-linearity of flows with respect to percentiles of past performance.  To relate 
the present investigation to prior research, in Figure I black squares represent average 
U.K. monthly fund flows (expressed as proportion of fund size) by previous year’s raw 
return decile, for the 1992-2001 period.  The non-linearity among the top performers is 
immediately apparent: going from the 9
th
 to the 10
th
 decile increases flows by 
approximately 1% of fund TNA, whereas dropping from the 9
th
 to the 8
th
 decile costs the 
fund less than 0.5% of TNA.  Consistent with existing evidence, the performance-flow 
                                                 
13
 Ideally, we would use the stock of money corresponding to each investor type for this 
comparison; unfortunately only flow data are available. 
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link is less strong among poor performers – although we find it to be pronounced and 
even visibly non-linear as one approaches the bottom decile. 
 
In addition to average flows, Figure I also shows the average raw return for each fund 
decile (marked with gray circles), thus representing the relation between fund raw return 
and its rank.  The non-linearity of this graph is unsurprising, as the top and bottom deciles 
are expected to contain extreme performers.  What is remarkable, however, is how 
closely its shape traces that of the flow-performance relation.  This suggests that investors 
may simply be reacting to the magnitude of the underlying performance measure rather 
than to its rank – or at least that we can expect there to be much less curvature when 
flows are related to unranked performance, as we do shortly. 
 
To check this more formally, we sort funds each month into 50 quantiles according to 
their raw returns over the previous year.  We then regress the average flow (relative to 
fund TNA) on the average monthly raw return over the previous year, as well as on the 
corresponding return quantile, quantile squared, and quantile cubed.  The results (not 
reported in a table) show that a linear function of raw returns explains flows as well or 
better than a third degree polynomial in ranked returns.  This suggests that the non-linear 
reaction of flows to relative performance at the very top of the performance scale can 
largely be explained by the greater magnitude of performance in these quantiles.  Fund 
managers aspiring to the top of the performance scale should therefore recognize that a 
one notch improvement in fund rank will necessarily involve an ever greater 
improvement in absolute fund performance as the performance scale is ascended.   
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[Figure II here] 
 
While Figure I tells us about how flows in aggregate respond to fund performance, it 
gives us little idea about which parts of the aggregate flow components are responsible.  
It also focuses on ranked performance, ignoring the magnitude of fund returns, and the 
effect of non-performance variables on fund flows is unaccounted for.  These 
shortcomings are addressed in Figure II where, for each channel and for each flow 
direction, we show the fitted values of a smoothed locally polynomial regression of 
residual flows on the previous year’s monthly average mean-adjusted return, that is, 
return in excess of the equal weighted average of all UK equity fund returns.  (The 
residuals come from regressing normalized flows on the fund’s initial and annual fees, as 
well as the logarithms of fund size, fund age, and the number of funds run by the 
management group.) 
 
Moving from raw return deciles to mean-adjusted returns and stripping the impact of fund 
attributes on money flows markedly alters the shape of the performance-flow relation.  
As suggested by the close correspondence between unranked returns and flows in Figure 
I, particularly for extreme performers, the relation between flows and unranked 
performance in Figure II is no longer characterized by two inflection points.  Instead, 
both for inflows and for outflows, the performance-flow link appears to be composed of 
two linear relations with a break near zero.  This suggests that a reasonable parsimonious 
representation of fund performance in studying the performance-flow relation across 
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investment channels can separately consider positive and negative performance, allowing 
flows to depend linearly on both negative and positive returns.  Such a parameterization 
will allow us to focus on what is essential about the link between flows and returns: the 
strength of the relation, and its curvature.
14
  Further, these results emphasize a key finding 
by papers that have examined the flow-performance relation for U.S. funds, namely, that 
fund buying and fund selling decisions are far from being a mirror image of one another, 
and should be examined separately.  Therefore, in the next section we address the 
behavior of inflows, and we examine outflows in Section IV. 
 
III. Fund Buying Behavior 
Previous research as well as the evidence in the preceding section indicate that different 
forces guide fund buying and fund selling decisions.  In this section we examine the 
determinants of the different investor types’ fund buying behavior.  Given the prima facie 
evidence on (past) performance chasing, we can expect most of our investor types to 
respond to past performance.  But how differently do they regard poor and good 
performance? 
 
Given the large number of channels that we examine, it is particularly important to 
address the curvature of the flow-performance relation in a parsimonious manner to 
facilitate cross-channel comparisons.  Figure II shows that smoothed performance-flow 
                                                 
14
 Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) show that (retail) mutual fund investors are characterized by 
more convex net flows than are institutional pension fund investors.  The inflows panel of Figure 
II appears consistent with these findings as it suggests that inflows are more convex for retail than 
for institutional investors. 
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graphs curve the most around the zero mean-adjusted return point.  Thus, we partition the 
monthly average mean-adjusted return over the preceding 12 months into its positive and 
negative components, and regress fund inflows on this partitioned measure of fund 
performance together with a set of control variables that may help explain fund inflows.  
As our inflow data include zero-flow months, we obtain our estimates using monthly 
cross-sectional Tobit regression, drawing inferences using the Fama-MacBeth 
methodology with Newey-West robust standard errors.
15
  As control variables we include 
the fund’s initial and annual fees (InitialFee and AnnualFee, respectively); FundSize, the 
logarithm of the fund TNA at the previous month-end; FundAge, the logarithm of the 
number of years since fund launch; and FamilySize, the logarithm of the number of funds 
in the fund family.  To ensure that we are genuinely measuring the sensitivity of inflows 
to past performance, we also include two additional variables in our regressions, Tracking 
and Timing.  Tracking is meant to proxy for the fund’s tracking error and is calculated as 
the standard deviation of monthly differences in total returns between the fund and the 
FTSE All-Share index, which is the most commonly-used performance benchmark in the 
UK.  Timing in our regressions is used to control for the possibility that some funds are 
more successful than others in timing the market and that investors pursue such funds 
with their inflows.  Accordingly, we define Timing as the coefficient on the square of the 
excess market return when this term is included as the fifth factor in the Carhart model.   
  
[Table III] 
 
                                                 
15
 We used five lags in the Newey-West adjustment.  Changing the number of lags made little 
difference. 
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Our results in Table III indicate that investors increase their inflows when performance is 
favorable and reduce their inflows when performance is poor.  Comparing these 
reactions, the response to favorable performance (186.98) is more than quadruple the 
response to poor performance (39.10) which results in the aggregate inflow-performance 
relation being significantly convex (p-value < 0.001).  As an example of how to interpret 
these coefficients, the response coefficient to favorable performance tells us that a 1% 
increase in average monthly fund performance over the past year (i.e. 12% increase in 
annual performance) leads to the growth rate of the fund relative to the growth rate of all 
funds rising by approximately 187%. 
 
When we compare retail with institutional investors, we find that institutional investors 
generally respond to positive and negative performance in a more muted fashion than 
retail investors.  Retail investors are nearly three times more sensitive to favorable 
performance than institutional investors and are just under twice as sensitive to poor 
performance.   It is possible to understand the way retail and institutional inflows as a 
whole respond to past performance by looking at the individual channels that comprise 
retail and institutional flows.  Our focus is on the reaction of inflows to favorable 
performance, as this is where inflows have their greatest influence on the total flow-
performance relationship. 
 
Among the retail channels, the independent advisors channel has the highest inflow 
sensitivity to favorable performance.  This is consistent with our expectations as advisors 
for this channel are paid on a transaction basis and we would expect them to make every 
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effort to make clients aware of the latest top performing funds in order to encourage them 
to change their holdings.  Tied-agent flows are much more muted in their reaction to 
favorable fund performance than are flows through the independently advised channel 
and this can be explained by the fact that these advisors get no additional compensation 
for getting investors to switch funds.  While private client advisors are also generally not 
paid on a transaction basis, we would expect them to justify their existence to investors 
by making some fund recommendations and hence it is not surprising that we see a 
significant positive relationship between inflows and favorable past performance for this 
channel, albeit not at the level of the independent advisors channel.  Direct investors are 
not held back by advisers in any way in their flow reaction and hence for these investors 
as well we see a pronounced inflow reaction to favorable fund performance. 
 
As regards institutional flows we find both pension fund inflows and unitized insurance 
inflows strongly chase past performance.  Pension fund trustees are typically advised by 
external consultants who need to justify the fees they charge by influencing trustee 
allocations.  These consultants are aware that fund trustees are more likely to take notice 
of their suggestions when their buy recommendations are funds that have done extremely 
well and when their sell recommendations relate to funds that have done extremely 
poorly.  In light of these incentives that external consultants face, it is not surprising 
therefore that we observe a high sensitivity of pension fund inflows to favorable 
performance. 
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The unitized insurance channel relates to flows from insurers who are selling insurance 
products that contain menus of mutual funds that retail investors can choose among.  To 
maximize their sales, insurers will have an incentive to rotate the menu of funds they 
offer over time to include the best recent performers and drop the worst performing 
funds.  This is, in fact, what we see in the data as unitized insurance flows chase 
favorable fund performance.  In contrast, for in-house insurer flows, where channel buy 
and sell decisions are made at the company level rather than at the individual investor 
level, flows aren't affected greatly by recent fund performance.  This probably reflects 
insurers’ understanding that there is limited persistence in mutual fund data. 
 
The last line of Table III presents details of hypothesis tests conducted to test whether 
inflows are more sensitive to favorable fund performance than to poor fund performance. 
These tests shed light on the origins of convexity in the aggregate inflow-performance 
relationship.  Our findings show that retail investors have significantly more convex 
flows than institutional investors.  This convexity among retail investors is attributable to 
the direct and independently advised channels with both channels, having inflows that are 
more than ten times more sensitive to positive than to negative performance.  We note 
that although for private client investors the difference between inflow sensitivities to 
positive and negative performance is nearly as large as it is for direct investors, this 
difference is not statistically significant, which is at least partly due to the much smaller 
number of observations for this channel (6,379 versus 23,396).  For investments made via 
tied agents, positive and negative flow-performance sensitivities are both very similar and 
quite low in magnitude, which is consistent with such investments being limited to a 
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single family’s range of funds.  For our three distinct institutional channels, only the 
unitized channel exhibits statistically significant convexity due to the strong reaction of 
inflows to favorable performance.  However even for this channel, the observed 
convexity is at a far lower level than for the direct and independently advised channels.  
In short, then, convexity in the inflow-performance relation is primarily driven by 
individuals investing either through independent advisors and to a lesser extent directly. 
 
How different are the different channels in our dataset?  The last six rows of Table III 
report p-values for comparisons of inflow-performance parameters for adjacent columns 
shed light on this question.  Although the three institutional channels are structurally very 
distinct, there is little evidence against equality of the flow-performance parameters for 
these channels.  As regards the retail channels, all three pairs have significantly different 
inflow-performance sensitivities in the region of favorable performance, and two out of 
three pairs display significantly different convexities.  Overall, then, these results show 
that if we were to group superficially similar investor types – i.e. the four retail 
distribution channels, or even the three intermediated retail channels – we would have 
pooled together investors with markedly different investment behaviors.
16
 
 
Table III also shows how investor inflows are influenced by factors other than past 
performance.  Although initial fees are a useful control variable in isolating the impact of 
other fund characteristics on performance, their coefficients (which range from highly 
                                                 
16
 In a robustness test, we examine the effect of using geometric average fund returns in excess of 
the geometric average FTSE All-Share market index return, with the latter as the point of 
inflection.  This change preserves the tenor of our results.  
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negatively to highly positively significant) are difficult to interpret across channels 
because these fees are often discounted or even waived.  Such is not typically the case for 
annual fees.  Investors across all retail advised channels invest more in funds with higher 
annual fees, which may be because these are associated with a higher level of service, a 
greater marketing effort or greater perceived fund quality.  Retail investors investing 
more in funds with higher annual fees is a phenomenon which is consistent with Sirri and 
Tufano (1998) who conjecture that  it is because the fees are spent on marketing thereby 
reducing investors' search costs.   Institutional investors, however, view annual fees less 
favorably and respond accordingly with lower investment levels, which may be because 
they are less swayed by advertising.  As our flows are scaled by fund size, it is 
unsurprising that funds that are younger, as measured by the logarithm of their age, and 
(in most cases) smaller, as measured by the logarithm of their TNA, generally benefit 
from greater inflows.  We also control for the size of the fund family, measured as the 
logarithm of the number of funds the family has.  Larger families attract lower per-fund 
flows via tied agent, private client and in-house insurance channels; this could be due to a 
perceived lack of focus for such funds.  We also include a tracking error variable in our 
regressions and we find no evidence of institutional investors punishing tracking error, 
although private client and tied agent retail channel investors do.  This is in contrast to 
Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) who show that while institutional investors punish 
managers who deviate from their benchmark with decreased flows, retail investors do 
not.  Our regressions also show no evidence that any of our investor classes are 
influenced by fund-level timing ability. 
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The goodness-of-fit statistics contained in Table III indicate that in aggregate retail flows 
are easier to explain than aggregate institutional flows.  Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) 
show that the explanatory power of their flow-performance regressions is lower for 
institutional flows than for retail flows and suggest that certain "difficult to measure" 
non-performance related manager characteristics might explain institutional flows.  Our 
aggregate results are therefore akin to theirs. However, our more detailed data that permit 
us to look beyond the aggregate results, reveal a less clear-cut picture.  The greater ability 
to explain retail flows in the data stems from the private client channel.  Interestingly, 
however, the explanatory power for retail direct flows is considerably lower and fund 
purchases and sales by direct retail investors are in fact the hardest flows to explain 
across all retail and institutional categories.  Likewise, the weak overall explanatory 
power in our aggregate institutional regressions does not carry over to all channels and is 
not the case for the in-house insurance channel.  The picture painted by Del Guercio and 
Tkac (2002) is that of institutional flows always being more difficult to explain. This 
representation does not appear to hold when we look at more disaggregated data. 
 
In further tests that we do not report for purposes of brevity, we re-run our flow-
performance regressions except that we now divide up fund mean-adjusted returns into a 
Carhart four-factor alpha (α) component, reflecting stock selection ability, and the 
remaining R–α component, attributable to exposures to common factors in stock returns.   
Doing so allows us to understand the extent to which overall convexity is the result of 
convexity in α or R–α and thus whether fund inflows incentivize managers to take bets on 
individual stocks, common factors or both.  It also sheds light on which performance 
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measures different investors use to make their buying and selling decisions.  Since UK 
equity fund managers tend to specialize in stock picking rather than in factor timing, an 
investor who believes in the predictive power of past performance should react more 
strongly to alpha than to the non-risk-adjusted return.   
 
Surprisingly, we find that fund inflows are convex in not only the alpha component of 
performance but also the non alpha part.  This convexity means that, in expectation, 
investors reward fund managers for gambling not only on individual stocks, but also on 
common factors in stock returns.  In other words, if a fund’s exposure to a common factor 
is different from its peers’ average exposure to that factor, then the fund’s high inflows 
when the factor does well will more than compensate for its low inflows when the factor 
does poorly. 
 
As regards which  part of returns investors use to make their flow decisions,  we find that 
in the majority of the channels that buying decisions  do not discriminate between α or R–
α performance.  Only tied agent and private client investors pay significantly more 
attention to α than to R–α performance when making their inflow decisions.  Since such 
behavior is consistent with paying active management fees (which, to a large extent, are 
meant to finance and reward stock selection activity), this suggests relative sophistication 
by investors buying funds through these channels.  The beliefs of investors who react 
strongly to α and comparably to R–α (independently advised and pension fund) and those 
who react to neither (in-house insurance) are harder to reconcile with their commitment 
to active management. 
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IV. Fund Selling Behavior 
In this section, we focus on ways in which investment performance prompts investors to 
sell mutual funds.  Analogously to the previous section, we study non-linearities in the 
reaction of outflows to the mean-adjusted return.
17
 
 
Consistent with our examination of inflow-performance convexity, we partition mean-
adjusted performance into positive and negative regions; as the bottom panel of Figure II 
shows, this is a reasonable way to capture outflow-performance non-linearity in a 
parsimonious manner.  Note also that, according to the graph, outflows tend to be convex 
with respect to fund performance.  Of course, a convex outflow-performance relation 
impacts assets under management in a similar way to a concave inflow-performance 
relation. 
[Table IV here] 
Table IV shows what happens when we regress our outflow measure for each channel on 
performance in positive and negative performance ranges as well as the battery of control 
variables we used in the preceding section.  As the literature leads us to expect, the 
reaction of outflows to performance is more muted than that of inflows and the reaction 
of outflows to fund performance is much stronger for below average performance than 
above (-53.66 vs. 2.86, p-value=0.002). 
  
                                                 
17 Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2009) suggest that taxes have an important impact on the behavior of 
outflows.  In unreported results, we conduct regressions analogous to those of Ivkovic and 
Weisbenner, but find outflows not to be influenced by taxes in our sample.  We therefore follow 
the same specification for our analyses of fund selling behavior as we did for buying behavior in 
the preceding section.  
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Clearly, outflows have the greatest impact on the overall flow-performance relationship 
when fund performance is poor.  If we focus on this region of the outflow-performance 
relationship what do our results reveal?  First, unlike for inflows, we do not see a 
significant difference between the reaction of retail outflows and institutional outflows to 
poor performance.  
 
Second, if we look at individual channels, the relative strength of the outflow reaction to 
poor performance across channels mirrors broadly our inflows results.  On the retail side, 
the fact that the independently advised channel reacts the most strongly to poor 
performance can be understood by the transaction-based incentives of advisers for this 
channel.  Private client and tied agent advisors have little incentive to encourage investors 
to switch funds and hence, unsurprisingly, we see low flow sensitivity to performance for 
these channels.  Like for inflows, direct investor outflows are sensitive to fund 
performance but not to the extent that they are for independently advised investors.  On 
the institutional side, outflows via the pension fund channel react most strongly to poor 
performance, which is consistent with the incentives of pension fund consultants. 
 
What contribution do outflows make to overall aggregate flow convexity? While in 
aggregate outflows increase as performance worsens at a faster rate when performance is 
below average than when it is above average, the magnitudes involved are quite a bit 
smaller than the corresponding magnitudes on the inflow side.  Thus, in aggregate, 
outflows offset only a small portion of the convexity brought about by the inflow-
performance relation.  Looking at retail and institutional outflows, both are modestly 
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concave in mean-adjusted returns, with statistical significance near or below the 5 percent 
mark.   Among individual channels, there is evidence of non-linearity only for the 
independently advised channel.   
 
In a similar fashion to our inflow analysis, we also conduct further outflow analysis 
regressions partitioning performance on α and R–α components of performance.    
We find that investors display significant outflow non-linearity for both α and R–α 
performance which is driven by retail independently advised investors.  Interestingly, the 
convexity in their outflow performance relationship for α stems from the strength of their 
reaction to poor performance, whereas their outflow convexity in R–α stems derives from 
their reaction to fund performance when performances lies above the cross-sectional 
average.   
 
What about the relative weights that different types of investors put on alpha and non-
alpha portions of performance when making their fund sale decisions?  In the positive-
performance region the difference is never significant, which is unsurprising given the 
low outflow-performance sensitivity for funds that did well.  In the negative performance 
region, though, there are some intriguing results.  Recall that on the inflow side, investors 
who put less weight on returns due to common factor exposures as compared to alphas 
were tied agent and direct ones.  On the outflow side, such is the case for direct and 
independently advised investors, both of whom flee low-alpha funds but are undeterred 
when the non-alpha portion of performance is poor.  Remarkably, selling via tied agents 
does the reverse: poor alpha is ignored, but poor non-alpha performance is punished.  In 
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other words, when these investors buy funds, they are unswayed by returns due to 
common factor tilts, but do take them into account when performance has been poor as 
they consider selling.  This discrepancy in the way buying and selling decisions are made 
once again highlights the importance of studying these decisions separately. 
 
V. Discussion and conclusion 
To date, work on the flow-performance relationship has focused on the average US 
investor and has found convexity in the aggregate flow-performance relationship.  
However there are a broad variety of fund trading channels.  Some are for retail investors, 
some are for institutional investors and some involve advisors and others do not.   Even 
within advised channels, the type of advice provided can vary from being transaction-
based to being long-term where adviser remuneration is based on a fixed fee or is a 
function of assets under management. 
 
In this paper we examine whether there are differences in the way different investors 
across distribution channels buy and sell mutual funds and whether the institutional 
features and the incentives of the parties involved in each channel have a bearing on these 
buy and sell decisions.   
 
We show that there are significant differences across distribution channels in fund inflow 
and outflow behavior, which tells us that the mix of distribution channels can influence 
the aggregate flow-performance relationship.  In addition, the incentives of the parties 
involved in each channel, especially the incentives of advisers, help to explain observed 
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flow sensitivities.  Our findings also allow us to understand the origins of aggregate flow-
performance convexity.  We show that this stems from the strong reaction of aggregate 
retail inflows to favorable fund performance, and in particular to the way independently 
advised investors buy into funds.  Interestingly, when we partition the investment return 
into its alpha-only non-alpha components, we show that not only do many categories 
make their buy and sell decisions on the basis of non-alpha performance but also that 
there is convexity in both the flow-alpha relationship as well as in the flow non-alpha 
relationship.  This result means that both risk-taking with respect to specific stocks, and 
risk-taking with respect to common factors are rewarded with higher investor inflows.   
 
In order to check on the robustness of our key findings, we perturb our empirical 
specifications in several ways.  First, we extend our performance measures to three years 
preceding the money flow in place of the one year performance that underlies results 
reported throughout the paper.  This actually increases the statistical significance of our 
findings, and suggests that by using one-year performance, we are being conservative in 
our conclusions.  Second, we check on our conclusions regarding flow-performance 
convexity by including both a performance term and a performance-squared term, in 
place of a piecewise linear performance specification.  We find that for every piecewise 
linear specification where the impact of the positive and negative portions of performance 
on flows is significantly different at the 0.05 level, the t-statistic of the performance-
squared term in the corresponding quadratic specification is 2.5 or higher.  This suggests 
that splitting performance into positive and negative portions adequately captures non-
linearity in the flow-performance relation.  Our use of the piecewise linear specification 
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is due to the greater ease with which the estimation results can be interpreted.  Lastly, 
when disaggregating performance into its alpha and non-alpha components, we use the 
Fama-French three-factor alpha in place of the Carhart four-factor one.  We find that the 
two sets of results are very close; in particular, all of the instances where convexity is 
significant using four-factor adjustment, are also significant under three-factor 
adjustment.   
 
Our results have implications both for fund management companies, and for regulators.  
For fund management companies, they suggest which distribution channels should be 
favored given their funds’ historical or anticipated performance.  Further, the fact that for 
retail investors, especially for independently advised ones, inflow is convex even in the 
portion of performance unrelated to stock picking skill, suggests that these investors 
reward the creation of funds following opposing styles, since increased flows to winning 
styles will more than offset decreased flows to losing styles. 
 
Our implications for regulators are both richer and more nuanced.   Although current 
evidence points to the outperformance of passive management on average, and passive 
investing is accordingly gaining in popularity, regulators are careful not to discourage 
active mutual fund investing altogether, as this would leave out mutual funds from the set 
of players policing market efficiencies and delivering investment gains to their investors 
in the process.  From the perspective of regulators, therefore, the best active fund 
investors are those who induce the most intense competition for superior performance 
among fund managers, i.e. those whose reaction to fund performance is especially strong.  
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At the same time, strong reaction to past performance tends to be convex, thus inducing 
excess risk-taking.  It also tends to spill over into sensitivity to non-alpha performance, 
rewarding active fund managers for actions unrelated to stock-picking, which is the 
activity that justifies active fees in the first place.  Weighing the pros and cons of these 
investor behaviors is not easy, and is well beyond the scope of this paper.  Rather, by 
characterizing how the different investors behave, our results serve to illuminate the 
options that are on the regulators’ menu. 
 
Despite the gradual availability of improved mutual fund flow data, much remains to be 
learned about how different investor types and different intermediaries contribute to the 
way the fund management industry is evolving.  Mandated changes to the way funds are 
distributed, such as those now afoot in the UK, will no doubt yield new insights.  Another 
promising avenue for future research is to examine how mutual fund investors behave 
across countries. 
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Table I.  Properties of Monthly Money Flows 
Panel A shows the distribution of raw and normalized monthly money flows and Panel B shows the correlation between normalized monthly money flows pooled across fund-
months over the 1992-2001 period.  The money flow types are coded as follows.  F_DRCT: direct from public; F_ADVS: intermediated by an independent financial advisor; 
F_AGNT: intermediated by company sales force; F_PRIV: private client; F_UNIT: unit-linked insurance; F_INHS: in-house insurance; F_PENS: pensions; F_OTHR: 
unclassified; F_RETL: all retail flows (direct, intermediated, and private client); F_INST: all institutional flows (insurance and pensions); F_TOTL: all flows (retail and 
institutional).  Normalized flows are raw flows scaled by fund value and then by the ratio of aggregate flow to aggregate fund value for that channel as described in the text.  In 
Panel B, correlations below the diagonal refer to inflows and correlations above the diagonal to outflows.  The last column of Panel B shows, for each flow type, the correlation 
between inflows and outflows. 
Panel A: Distribution of monthly money flows 
Raw Flow Normalized Flow
Inflow Outflow Inflow Outflow
Flow type N Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
(1) F_DRCT 27287 202 782 278 847 1.51 6.01 1.41 3.76
(2) F_ADVS 26275 703 2633 432 1369 1.68 4.32 1.64 3.88
(3) F_AGNT 15550 815 3278 345 1388 1.24 3.56 0.94 2.14
(4) F_PRIV 7298 303 1166 143 457 2.23 7.47 2.27 7.97
(5) F_UNIT 12370 622 3388 493 6879 1.06 3.58 0.94 3.48
(6) F_INHS 6957 333 2105 405 2248 1.04 7.01 0.76 2.83
(7) F_PENS 12731 1013 4614 905 4692 0.81 2.79 0.82 3.07
(8) F_OTHR 3914 213 1548 273 2774 0.96 6.00 0.71 5.00
(9) F_RETL 30610 1270 3740 828 2031 1.67 3.25 1.57 2.69
(10) F_INST 21558 1102 4809 997 6848 0.94 2.88 0.89 2.84
(11) F_TOTL 31692 1976 5565 1478 6101 1.40 2.47 1.31 2.18  
 
Panel B: Correlations between normalized monthly money flows 
Flow type F_DRCT F_ADVS F_AGNT F_PRIV F_UNIT F_INHS F_PENS F_RETL F_INST F_TOTL In/Out flow
F_DRCT 0.076 -0.029 -0.019 -0.007 -0.012 -0.006 0.518 -0.011 0.388 0.050
F_ADVS 0.180 0.069 0.046 0.065 0.015 0.162 0.816 0.095 0.656 0.033
F_AGNT 0.046 0.048 -0.013 0.084 0.035 0.073 0.409 0.061 0.277 0.158
F_PRIV 0.050 0.111 0.074 -0.009 -0.015 0.004 0.561 -0.004 0.443 0.035
F_UNIT 0.072 0.178 0.097 0.038 0.038 0.026 0.055 0.689 0.501 0.021
F_INHS 0.191 0.032 -0.004 -0.042 0.074 -0.023 -0.010 0.557 0.448 0.065
F_PENS 0.029 0.126 0.069 0.106 0.042 0.014 0.111 0.838 0.655 0.055
F_RETL 0.423 0.811 0.815 0.568 0.179 0.096 0.112 0.063 0.797 -0.001
F_INST 0.081 0.132 0.029 0.033 0.669 0.549 0.896 0.117 0.761 0.049
F_TOTL 0.375 0.716 0.670 0.499 0.558 0.412 0.651 0.869 0.718 -0.023
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Table II.  Fund Characteristics Weighted by Money Inflows 
This table shows fund characteristics for different distribution channels.  To calculate these numbers, fund-level attribute information are gathered for all funds serving a given 
channel each month.  Monthly fund attribute information is based on the characteristics of the fund concerned that month. A weighted average of these statistics is then 
calculated using fund-level money inflows as weights to provide aggregate fund attributes by channel. Equally-weighted and value-weighted fund attributes are presented at the 
bottom of the table for purposes of comparison.  Money flow types are coded as follows.  F_DRCT: direct from public; F_ADVS: intermediated by an independent financial 
advisor; F_AGNT: intermediated by company sales force; F_PRIV: private client; F_UNIT: unit-linked insurance; F_INHS: in-house insurance; F_PENS: pensions; F_RETL: 
all retail flows (direct, intermediated, and private client); F_INST: all institutional flows (insurance and pensions); F_TOTL: all flows (retail and institutional).  “Fund Size” is 
the TNA of the fund in £ million, “Initial Fee” and “Annual Fee” are the front load and annual charge, “Fund Age” is the number of years since fund launch, and “Family Size” 
is the number of U.K. open-end funds run by the fund management group.   
 
Fund Attributes
Weighted by Fund Size Initial Fee Annual Fee Fund Age Family Size
F_DRCT 458.8 4.94 1.23 18.7 26.0
F_ADVS 464.9 4.85 1.29 15.3 26.7
F_AGNT 542.7 5.10 1.24 10.7 14.3
F_PRIV 255.7 4.77 1.20 15.7 20.3
F_UNIT 845.6 4.27 1.17 17.2 28.9
F_INHS 645.0 4.91 1.10 18.1 18.2
F_PENS 933.5 2.96 0.80 15.3 33.9
F_RETL 477.5 4.94 1.26 14.3 22.2
F_INST 858.7 3.66 0.96 16.5 30.7
F_TOTL 622.1 4.45 1.14 15.1 25.4
Unity 171.1 4.81 1.22 14.5 20.3
Fund Size 782.8 4.57 1.11 19.5 25.7  
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Table III.  Non-linearity of the Inflow-Performance Relation 
This table shows the results of regressing fund inflows for different distribution channels on investment performance measures over the 12-month period preceding the flow and 
an array of control variables.  The money flow types are coded as follows.  F_DRCT: direct from public; F_ADVS: intermediated by an independent financial advisor; 
F_AGNT: intermediated by company sales force; F_PRIV: private client; F_UNIT: unit-linked insurance; F_INHS: in-house insurance; F_PENS: pensions; F_RETL: all retail 
flows (direct, intermediated, and private client); F_INST: all institutional flows (insurance and pensions); F_TOTL: all flows (retail and institutional).  Money flows are 
normalized, i.e. scaled by fund value and by the aggregate ratio of flows to fund value as described in the text.  The explanatory variables are as follows.  R | R<0 equals the 
average mean-adjusted monthly return if this quantity is negative, and zero otherwise, while R | R>0 equals the average mean-adjusted monthly return if this quantity is 
positive, and zero otherwise; returns are averaged over the 12-month period preceding the money flow.  Tracking is the squared root of the monthly average squared difference 
between fund return and FTSE All Share return.  Timing is the coefficient on the square of the excess market return when this variable is added to the regression of fund returns 
on the four Carhart (1997) factors.   InitialFee and AnnualFee are the advertised front load and annual management charges.  FundSize, FundAge, and FamilySize are, 
respectively, logarithms of the fund TNA, of its age, and of the number of funds in its family.  The estimation is done using the Tobit model for each calendar month, with the 
flow variable censored from below at zero.  The table reports average monthly coefficient estimates, followed by Newey-West adjusted t-statistics.  Pseudo-R2 is the squared 
correlation between non-zero flows and their predicted values.  The last six rows display p-values of the stated hypothesis tests. 
 
Dependent variable
Explanatory Retail Flows Institutional Flows Aggregate Flows
Variable F_DRCT F_ADVS F_AGNT F_PRIV F_UNIT F_INHS F_PENS F_RETL F_INST F_TOTL
intercept 5.18 4.6 3.52 6.0 2.50 3.4 25.57 4.5 2.07 2.7 5.86 2.6 4.84 5.5 3.49 6.4 2.89 5.4 2.18 5.4
R | R<0 15.75 1.1 33.53 1.8 43.95 2.5 114.62 2.3 13.38 0.9 -39.58 -1.1 41.67 2.9 46.26 3.9 25.79 2.6 39.10 4.6
R | R>0 200.69 7.5 378.73 7.7 37.60 1.6 288.67 2.7 102.52 4.2 55.24 1.2 78.32 4.6 244.13 9.1 91.75 5.2 186.98 8.7
Tracking -7.79 -1.1 8.56 0.6 -20.64 -4.2 -108.93 -2.5 5.52 0.9 -6.59 -0.4 -0.02 0.0 -12.13 -1.3 5.39 0.9 -6.20 -0.9
Timing 0.00 0.0 0.02 0.5 0.05 1.5 0.08 0.5 -0.01 -0.3 0.11 1.5 0.00 0.2 0.02 0.6 0.01 0.5 0.02 1.0
InitialFee 3.39 1.1 -4.82 -1.4 -1.28 -0.4 -80.06 -2.9 9.68 1.1 21.37 2.4 -9.19 -5.2 -0.05 0.0 -7.33 -4.4 -1.97 -1.8
AnnualFee -7.25 -0.5 50.23 4.7 63.57 2.5 71.58 2.4 12.90 0.7 -101.08 -2.1 -104.59 -7.0 71.22 5.4 -68.45 -6.3 19.51 2.1
FundSize -0.18 -3.9 -0.10 -3.1 0.08 2.1 -0.89 -3.3 -0.02 -0.7 -0.11 -1.3 -0.09 -2.5 -0.07 -3.0 -0.01 -0.2 0.00 0.0
FundAge -0.34 -4.6 -0.60 -9.5 -0.89 -8.7 -0.63 -3.8 -0.74 -10.2 -0.48 -2.2 -0.46 -5.2 -0.69 -10.1 -0.58 -9.8 -0.61 -10.3
FamilySize 0.01 0.1 0.03 0.3 -0.40 -10.2 -0.31 -1.4 0.10 1.1 -0.50 -2.6 0.14 1.9 -0.02 -0.7 0.20 3.3 0.10 2.9
N fund-months 23,396 22,585 13,813 6,379 10,991 6,443 10,970 26,025 18,820 26,936
Pseudo R
2 0.095 0.230 0.230 0.566 0.186 0.496 0.248 0.196 0.152 0.182
Hypothesis tests
 βR | R<0 = βR | R>0 0.000 0.000 0.851 0.231 0.006 0.169 0.163 0.000 0.006 0.000
 for adjacent columns:
   equal βR | R<0 
   equal βR | R>0 
   equal βR | R>0 – βR | R<0 
0.424 0.1870.666
0.000 0.000 0.026 0.395 0.614 0.000
0.192 0.038 0.207
0.001 0.000 0.231 0.942 0.394 0.000  
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Table IV.  Non-linearity of the Outflow-Performance Relation 
This table shows the results of regressing fund outflows for different distribution channels on investment performance measures over the 12-month period preceding the flow 
and an array of control variables.  The money flow types are coded as follows.  F_DRCT: direct from public; F_ADVS: intermediated by an independent financial advisor; 
F_AGNT: intermediated by company sales force; F_PRIV: private client; F_UNIT: unit-linked insurance; F_INHS: in-house insurance; F_PENS: pensions; F_RETL: all retail 
flows (direct, intermediated, and private client); F_INST: all institutional flows (insurance and pensions); F_TOTL: all flows (retail and institutional).  Money flows are 
normalized, i.e. scaled by fund value and by the aggregate ratio of flows to fund value as described in the text.  The explanatory variables are as follows.  R | R<0 equals the 
average mean-adjusted monthly return if this quantity is negative, and zero otherwise, while R | R>0 equals the average mean-adjusted monthly return if this quantity is 
positive, and zero otherwise; returns are averaged over the 12-month period preceding the money flow.  Tracking, Timing, InitialFee, AnnualFee, FundSize, FundAge, and 
FamilySize are as defined in Table III.  The estimation is done using the Tobit model for each calendar month, with the flow variable censored from below at zero.  The table 
reports average monthly coefficient estimates, followed by Newey-West adjusted t-statistics.  Pseudo-R2 is the squared correlation between non-zero flows and their predicted 
values.  The last six rows display p-values of the stated hypothesis tests. 
 
Dependent variable
Explanatory Retail Flows Institutional Flows Aggregate Flows
Variable F_DRCT F_ADVS F_AGNT F_PRIV F_UNIT F_INHS F_PENS F_RETL F_INST F_TOTL
intercept 5.25 6.1 6.52 12.9 5.37 6.6 23.31 5.9 0.51 0.6 2.08 2.0 6.13 5.4 5.68 9.4 2.35 4.5 3.23 7.1
R | R<0 -70.13 -2.4 -95.86 -3.8 -8.53 -0.6 18.18 0.3 -24.49 -1.8 -25.77 -1.3 -37.70 -1.2 -59.34 -3.0 -47.39 -2.5 -53.66 -3.9
R | R>0 4.75 0.2 25.41 1.4 -18.10 -1.5 13.11 0.3 19.36 1.1 21.28 0.9 0.20 0.0 6.97 0.6 2.03 0.2 2.86 0.4
Tracking 11.81 2.1 41.03 5.1 -20.68 -6.0 2.56 0.2 5.12 0.9 2.09 0.2 15.71 2.1 17.85 3.9 12.99 2.9 16.97 5.0
Timing -0.07 -1.7 -0.01 -0.5 0.07 3.0 0.05 0.4 0.02 0.4 -0.03 -0.5 -0.03 -0.9 -0.02 -1.3 -0.02 -0.8 -0.02 -1.2
InitialFee 15.71 5.0 -1.82 -0.6 -10.04 -1.6 -40.37 -3.2 5.69 1.2 5.51 0.8 -21.10 -5.3 3.38 1.6 -15.03 -6.0 -2.41 -2.0
AnnualFee 61.18 6.6 22.43 1.8 -40.21 -4.6 69.98 1.6 41.20 1.4 -32.32 -2.4 -138.20 -8.7 51.60 8.1 -64.62 -6.1 3.12 0.5
FundSize -0.31 -6.6 -0.43 -16.3 -0.15 -3.9 -1.09 -5.8 0.01 0.3 -0.05 -1.3 -0.19 -3.4 -0.35 -9.7 -0.01 -0.5 -0.17 -5.9
FundAge 0.07 1.2 -0.04 -0.8 -0.17 -1.9 0.29 1.8 -0.36 -3.6 -0.17 -1.2 -0.16 -2.4 0.02 0.6 -0.28 -8.4 -0.06 -2.4
FamilySize -0.12 -1.6 0.57 10.0 0.05 0.9 -0.36 -1.1 0.09 1.2 -0.01 -0.1 0.22 3.4 0.31 8.5 0.22 4.2 0.33 10.6
N fund-months 23,396 22,585 13,813 6,379 10,991 6,443 10,970 26,025 18,820 26,936
Pseudo R
2 0.120 0.142 0.160 0.420 0.177 0.396 0.273 0.129 0.128 0.111
Hypothesis tests
 βR | R<0 = βR | R>0 0.060 0.001 0.691 0.962 0.068 0.146 0.393 0.010 0.064 0.002
 for adjacent columns:
   equal βR | R<0 
   equal βR | R>0 
   equal βR | R>0 – βR | R<0 
0.259 0.027 0.537 0.939 0.450 0.709
0.424 0.067 0.378 0.169 0.143 0.621
0.252 0.001 0.965 0.930 0.868 0.611  
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Figure I.  Returns and Flows by Return Decile in the U.K. 
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Note:  We rank funds by average monthly raw return decile over the previous 12 months.  For each decile, 
we plot the average ratio of net flow to fund size, and the average monthly raw return.  Data are for 1992-
2001. 
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Figure II.  Mutual Fund Money Flows and Mean-Adjusted Returns 
 
 
 
Note: Ordinary least squares is first used to regress scaled fund flow by channel on a set of explanatory 
variables excluding past performance.  Variables used include fund size, fund age and the number of funds 
in the fund family (all in log form), fund initial and annual fee, and calendar year dummies.  The resulting 
by-channel flow residuals are then related to fund mean-adjusted returns using local polynomial regression 
with a tri-cube weighting system to estimate predicted values of residual scaled flow.  These predicted 
values of residual scaled fund flow are plotted against the previous year’s fund mean-adjusted return for 
retail, institutional, and total channel aggregates. 
 
 
